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Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 43
5, 6
Considerations governing review of certiorari,
ff
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter
of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be
granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following, while neither
controlling nor wholly measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that
will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same
issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in a way
that is in conflict with a decision of this court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a
departure by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of this court's power of supervision; or

•li-

(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or federal
law which has not been, but should be, settled by
this court."
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a)
"Effect, In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall
be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of
its action. Requests for findings are not necessary
for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses. The
findings of a master, to the extent that the court
adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of
the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of the
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need
not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for Its decision on
all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and
(b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more
than one ground."
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 106
Remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements.
"When a writing or recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an dverse party
may require him at that time to introduce any other
part or any other writing or recorded statement
which ought In fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it."

-ill-
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this Brief, the Plaintiff, who is the Respondent to
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, will be referred to as
Miller.

The Third-Party Defendant William J. Colman will be

referred to as Colman.

A principal witness in this case was

Frank J. Allen, an attorney authorized to practice in the State
of Utah, and he will be referred to herein as Allen.

The Utah

Court of Appeals will be referred to as the Court of Appeals.
Reference to the Transcript of the Trial Court's proceedings
will be designated as "T". Reference to the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact will be designated as ffFOFff. Petitioners will
be referred to as Appellants.

All emphasis is added.

A copy

of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Judgment and Decree, of the Court of Appeals1 Decision and
of Colman's Affidavit (Ex. p. 28) are appended hereto.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case as found by the Trial Court and
affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals are as follows:
The property subject of this action is an 1840.14 acre
tract with appurtenant water rights located in Cache County,
Utah, commonly known as the Anderson Ranch (hereafter "the
Ranch") (FOF No. 1). In 1981, the Ranch was owned by Royalty
Investment, a corporation controlled by Colman (FOF No. 3). At
this same time, Colman was the President of Owanah Oil
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Corporation (Owanah), which owned certain mineral rights in
Churchill County, Nevada known as the "Carson Sink Salt
Project" (FOF No. 4).
Colman urgently needed money to further development of the
Carson Sink Project and in the late summer or early fall of
1981 approached Appellants about a loan of $750,000.00, offering to secure the loan by the Ranch (FOF No. 4). Appellants
declined.

Colman then offered Appellants a limited partnership

investment in Carson Sink and an interest in the Ranch.

After

consulting with their accountants, Appellants offered to make
$500,000.00 available to Colman if a transaction could be
structured as follows:

(1) a $250,000.00 investment in the

limited partnership, providing research and development tax
write-offs, an interest in profits during the life of the
partnership, and an overriding royalty thereafter, and (2) cash
payment of $250,000.00 as the purchase price of the Ranch,
coupled with a one-year option under which Colman could
repurchase the ranch for $600,000.00, allowing Appellants to
treat the dollar return if the option to purchase was exercised
as capital gain (FOF No. 7). The term of the Option was later
extended to a year and one-half and the price was increased to
$650,000.00 (FOF No. 9). The one (l) year option for
$600,000.00 was never signed (FOF No. 9).
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Allen, Colman's attorney, drafted the documents according
to this plan.

Allen structured the deal as three separate

transactions in order to achieve the tax advantages Appellants
sought:

(1) a limited partnership interest; (2) the purchase

of the Ranch for $250,000.00; and (3) a one-year option to
repurchase the Ranch for $650,000.00. All three (3) documents
were prepared and signed at the same time in Allen's office as
part of an integrated transaction (FOF No. 15).
The Option states that it was given to Colman "in
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5000.00)
and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged.ff

Allen testified that the recital of

"$5000.00 and other good and valuable consideration the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged11 was inserted by him merely as
a legal shorthand for the true consideration.

He testified the

$5,000.00 was never intended to be the actual consideration for
the Option and that is why the recital indicated that $5,000.00
and other good and valuable consideration had been paid.

Allen

further testified that the real consideration for the Option
was the execution of the limited partnership agreement, the
Ranch agreement, and the various tax benefits accruing to
Appellants by the structuring of the deal (FOF No. 21).
Colman did not pay $5,000.00 to Appellants for the Option.
Appellants made various verbal inquiries regarding payment
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after the date on the face of the Option, to which Colman
responded he did not believe he had to pay the $5,000.00 based
on the advice of Allen (FOF No. 25).
On November 2, 1982, Colman executed a Real Estate
Contract which assigned his rights under the Option to Miller
when Colman could not secure the $650,000.00 necessary to
exercise the Option himself (FOF No. 36 and No. 37).
Subsequently, Appellants received written notice of this
assignment and contacted Miller to inform him that the
$5,000.00 for the Option had never been paid by Colman (FOF No.
42).

In addition, despite the lack of payment, Archer stated

that he and Wolfe were still willing to sell the Ranch to
Miller for a purchase price of $655,000.00 (FOF No. 42).
Negotiations for this sale occurred, but it was never
consummated (FOF No. 43).
On April 8, 1983, Appellants attempted to revoke the
Option (FOF No. 44). Subsequently, Miller, Colman and Allen
met and discussed the status of the Option and all agreed that
the $5,000.00 was never intended to be paid, but merely
functioned as window-dressing.

The true consideration

consisted of the structuring of the transaction for Appellants'
tax advantage.

Allen and Colman executed affidavits to this

effect following this meeting (FOF No. 45 and Ex. p. 27 and p.
28).

In his Affidavit, Colman stated:
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"6. All of the papers for the three transactions
which made up our total deal were completed before we ever
signed the limited partnership agreement and it was agreed
that the ranch purchase instruments would be dated about 3
months after the limited partnership certificate, and the
option about three months after the purchase. Archer and
Wolfe acknowledged that they had received the
consideration for the option because that was a part of
the total deal we had made. The whole concept of our
agreement was that Archer and Wolfe would realize a 20%
return on a $500,000 investment and would be able to show
that return as capital gain as well as show $250,000 as
expenses in 1981 and 1982. (Ex. p. 28, paragraph 6)
On May 16, 1983, Miller filed this action against
Appellants and a Lis Pendens against the Ranch.

Appellants

later filed a Third-Party Complaint against Colman.

On July 1,

1983, Miller tendered to Appellants a cashier's check for
$650,000.00 as an exercise of the Option to purchase the Ranch
and the tender was refused.

The check was then deposited with

the Clerk of the Court who deposited it in an interest-bearing
account, with the entitlement to interest to be determined by
the court (F0F No. 54 and No. 55). Since Miller's July 1, 1983
tender and until this case was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, Appellants held possession and all rights of ownership
to the Ranch (FOF No. 67).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (R0SC) sets
forth the standard for review on a Writ of Certiorari and
provides:
"Rule 43.

Considerations governing review of certiorari.
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"Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor
wholly measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered
a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of
the Court of Appeals on the same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided
a question of state or federal law in a way that is in
conflict with a decision of this court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered
a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or federal law
which has not been, but should be, settled by this
court."
ARGUMENT
Measured by the above standards of review, the Petition of
Appellants for Certiorari is without merit.
Appellants raise four (4) questions for review.

(See

pages 1 and 2 of Petitioners' Brief.) Each question in effect
requests this Court to review the Findings of Fact of the Trial
Court.

The Court of Appeals has already reviewed the Trial

Court's Findings of Fact and affirmed them.

This the Court of

Appeals had the duty to do unless the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact were clearly eroneous (Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure).

Petitioners now request the Court to make a second

review of the Trial Court's Findings.
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1.

Appellants contend in their first question for review

that the testimony of Allen relied upon by the Court of Appeals
as the "substantial evidence11 in support of the Trial Courtfs
ruling does not exist.

The answer to this assertion is

two-fold:
(a) First, a citation from the record testimony of Allen
shows such evidence does exist.

Allen testified:

"Q. Why did you use the figure $5,000 in that
instrument?"
"A. I thought it important to use, to express a consideration, because an option, in my judgment, is not
enforceable unless it is granted for adequate consideration. It was appropriate, i^f 1^ were to comply with the
desires of the parties that none of these instruments
should "reTer to the "others, it is appropriate to state the
consideration in terms of Dollars." (T., page 64, lines
16-22)
It is clear that Appellants did not want to leave a paper
trail for the Internal Revenue Service to follow in this
transaction for fear that the Internal Revenue Service, seeing
the paper trail, would look past the form of the transaction to
its substance and disallow some of Appellants tax benefits from
the deal.

Referring in the Option to the capital gain

benefits, royalty overrides and expense write-offs as
consideration would have left such a paper trail.
reason, Allen, in order

For this

,f

to comply with the desires of the

parties that none of these instruments should refer to the
others ...ff, carried out the parties' desires and intent by

-7-

quantifying the consideration as

f,

$5,000 and other good and

valuable consideration" (not $5,000.00 only as Appellants are
want to point out).
(b) Secondly, the consideration for the Option was not
$5,000.00.

It was "$5000 and other good and valuable

consideration.ff

Allen's testimony makes it clear that

Appellants would not have advanced the money for the
partnership without having the contract on the Ranch signed and
Colman would not sign the Ranch contract unless he had an
option to repurchase the Ranch.

Allen testified:

"A. ... My recollection is that Wolfe, neither Wolfe nor
Archer made any contribution to the limited partnership
until he was sure that he had the right to acquire the
Anderson Ranch for the $250,000 stated in that agreement.
..." (T., page 68, lines 8-12)
ff

Q. Did you advise Mr. Colman on the question of whether
or not he should enter into the transaction for the sale
of the property without an option back to buy it?
"A.

Yes, I did.

"Q.

What was that advice?

"A. Well, I advised him that he would be in a very poor
position to demand the right to repurchase the ranch
unless he had in his hand the instrument which gave him
the right before he executed the contract for its sale.
"Q. Was it on that basis that you then executed these
three documents, 3, 4, and 8, simultaneously?
"A.

Well, of course, I didn't execute them.

ff

They were executed?

Q.

"A. It was on that basis that I did what I could to
influence the parties to execute those instruments all at
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the same time. So each of them had the necessary—what I
considered to be the necessary assurance that the only one
would perform the whole deal, the whole package at the
time the first of the instruments were executed." (T.,
page 68, lines 17-25, and page 69, lines 1-13)
2.

Appellants next contend that there was a necessity of

a finding by the Trial Court of ambiguity in the term

ff

$5000

and other good and valuable consideration11 before parol
evidence could be used to explain the term "other good and
valuable consideration.ff

The term "$5000" is not ambiguous.

The term "other good and valuable consideration" is ambiguous.
To explain what the other "good and valuable consideration" was
does not alter the instrument in violation of the parol
evidence rule as Appellants contend.

This Court stated in

Falkner vs. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (1983):
"When a contract is ambiguous, because of the uncertain
meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies, parol evidence is admissable to explain the
parties f intent."
The testimony of Allen amply "explained the parties1
intent" in using the terms "other good and valuable
consideration."
Even if the $5,000.00 were to have been paid (which there
is evidence from the testimonies of both Allen and Colman was
not the case) and was not paid, there were other considerations
to support the Option, to-wit:

the tax and other benefits to

Appellants in the transaction and the sale of the Ranch itself.
Where one of two considerations for a contract is for any
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reason insufficient, but not illegal, the other
consideration, if sufficient, will suffice to uphold the
contract.

Luther v. National Bank of Commerce, 98 P.2d 667

(Wash. 1940) and U.
1963).

S. v. Schaefer, 319 E.2d 907 (9th Circuit

In addition, sufficient consideration for an option was

supplied solely by the original sales transaction of which the
repurchase option was a part.

(Commuter Development

Investment v. Granlich, 279 N.W.2d 394 (Nebraska 1979, and
Gerald Elbon, Inc. v. Seegren, 338 N.E.2d 626 (Illinois 1978))
Appellants1 argument on this point lacks candor.

The

Option states "$5000 and other good and valuable consideration,
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.ff

Appellants seek to

void the language "receipt of which is hereby acknowledged11 by
introducing parol while at the same time contending Miller
cannot use parol to show the meaning of "other good and
valuable consideration".
3.

Appellants next contend that the Court should grant

certiorari to review the question of whether certain evidence,
particularly notes made by Colman, were admissible and attempt
to make both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals1 action
on this issue an interpretation of Rule 106 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.
The answer to this contention is first that the notes were
not admitted as evidence but only for impeachment purposes.
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(See the handwritten interlineation in the Conclusion of
Law No. 14 by Judge Call.) The notes were not the only source
of impeaching Colman's testimony.

His testimony was also

impeached by his affidavit (Ex. 28) and his deposition.
FOF No. 33.)

(See

Secondly, the Trial Court specifically found that

"... Colman's ... handwritten notes are not strictly necessary
to the Court's decision herein ..." (FOF No. 33). Thus, if
admission of the notes was error, the error had no effect on
the Court's decision and is therefore harmless and not a basis
for reversing the judgments.
Appellants have urged upon the Trial Court, the Court of
Appeals, and now upon this Court that the Trial Court's
Findings and Decree make the deed given by Colman to Appellants
in effect a mortgage (see Appellants' Brief p. 11). This is
not the holding of the Trial Court but is a fiction
manufactured by Appellants.

The decision of the Trial Court as

affirmed by the Court of Appeals gives full effect to all three
(3) instruments, the limited partnership agreement, the
contract and the option, and merely enforces the option.
Appellants got all they bargained for in the transaction, the
benefits of the partnership, and $650,000.00 cash back.
4.

Appellants' final contention is that by allowing

Miller the interest accrued on the $650,000.00 deposited to
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exercise the Option, the Court of Appeals held contrary to
this Court's ruling in Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah
1980).
Eliason is factually different from the case at Bar. In
Eliason, the buyer tendered the money required by the contract
and the tender was refused.

During the pendency of the action,

buyer then retained the tendered money for his own use.

In

addition, in Eliason, the buyer, in his suit for specific
performance, also sued for damages in the form of the rentals
he was deprived of.
In the case at Bar, the buyer (Miller) actually tendered
his money into Court and thereby was deprived of its use during
the pendency of this action.
money or use of the property.

Miller had neither use of his
Appellants on the other hand had

full use of the property and collected the rentals therefrom.
Appellants were thus placed in position of enjoying all
economic benefits from the Ranch until possession was delivered
to Miller.
This is not a case where Eliason applies, and the Court of
Appeals correctly so held.
the rents.

In the Eliason case, buyer sought

In this case, the buyer does not seek the rents.

The Court of Appeals correctly concluded:
"Common law and equity require that if a party
obligated to sell land retains possession, forcing the
buyer to place funds on deposit with the court pending
settlement of the action, then the seller is not entitled
to the accrued interest on the deposited funds."
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following Rasmusson v. Moe, 292 P.2d 226 (Cal. 1956) and
Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So. 2nd 770 (Fla. 1961).
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court in Ellis v. Mihelis, 384
P.2d 7 (Utah 1963) expressly noted an exception to the rule in
the Ellis case when "... the purchaser has, with notice to the
seller, set aside money toward the purchase price in such a
manner as to realize no use or benefit therefor.11

(ibid., page

16) Miller fits this exception, having set aside with the
Clerk of the Court the $650,000.00 purchase price so as to
realize no use or benefit therefrom.
CONCLUSION
This case, while of great importance to the litigants, is
of no great consequence to the body of law of this state. The
case was decided on settled legal principals adequately
reviewed on established principals of appellate review by an
appellate court.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was not

in conflict with any decision of any other panel of the Court
of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals did not decide a question of

state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with
decisions of this Court.

The decision of the Utah Court of

Appeals does not depart from any accepted course of judicial
proceedings.

There is no important question of municipal,

state or federal law to be settled by this Court. The
Appellants have advanced no "special and important reasons" for
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issuing the requested writ.

Nor have Appellants advanced

any reason within the framework of the "character of reasons"
set forth in Rule 43 of the ROSC why this Court should grant
certiorari.

On the other hand, Miller has shown that each

contention of Appellants has been reviewed, considered, and is
supported by the evidence in the record and by the law
applicable thereto.

The requested Writ of Certiorari should

therefore be denied.
DATED this 10th day of May, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSON & HOGGAN

£ Hoggan
L. Brent
Attorneys for Plai'
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief in Opposition to
Appellants1 Petition For Writ of Certiorari to:
E. Craig Smay
Sessions & Moore
Attorneys for Appellants
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 10th day of May, 1988.

LBH/36

L. Brent Hoggan
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Ernest J. MILLER. Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
John D. ARCHER and Elizabeth 15. Archer, both individually and ns Trustees
for the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust,
and Hubert Wolfe, Judy W. Wolfe, and
Elliott Wolfe, as Trustees for Elliott
Wolfe Trust No. 701, Defendants and
Appellants.
John D. ARCHER and Elizabeth B. Archer, both individually and as Trustees
for the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust,
and Hubert Wolfe, Judy W. Wolfe, and
Elliott Wolfe, an Trustees for Elliott
Wolfe Trust No. 701, Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
William J. COLMAN,
Third-Party Defendant.
No. 860371-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah
Feb. 10, 1988.

Appeal was taken from order of the
District Court, Box Elder County, Omer J.
Call, J., ordering specific performance of
option to buy land in favor of option holder's assignee and awarding accrued interest to assignee. The Court of Appeals,
Billings, J., held that: (1) substantial evidence supported finding that recital in real
estate option contract acknowledging receipt of "$5,000 and other good and valuable consideration" was nominal consideration inserted by drafter of agreement for
convenience; (2) evidence established that
structure of real estate transaction was
intended consideration for real estate option agreement; and (3) option holder's assignee was entitled to accruing interest on
money deposited with clerk of court after
parties who gave option refused tender of
payment by assignee and retained possession of subject real estate.
Affirmed.
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Utah
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Cite as 749 P 2<i | 274 (UfuhApp. 1988)

1. Evidence <£=>432

Even if written agreement appears to
be completely integrated, parol evidence is
admissible to establish whether there was
consideration for a promise
2. Contracts <s=>82
Recital of consideration received is
usually intended merely as written acknowledgment of distinct act of payment,
it is inserted for convenience, usually because parties do not want to reveal real
consideration.
3. Evidence <*=>419(1)
Parol evidence rule does not prevent
party from showing actual consideration
when nominal consideration is recited.
4. Vendor and Purchaser «=*44
Substantial evidence supported finding
that recital in real estate option contract
acknowledging receipt of "$5,000 and other
good and valuable consideration" was nominal consideration inserted by drafter for
convenience because parties did not wish to
reveal in writing true consideration; option
holder's attorney testified that he had consistently informed parties that he had inserted $5,000 amount on his own, intending
it as legal shorthand for true consideration
and was not an item for which parties
bargained.
5. Evidence <*=>419(13)
After determining that receipt of
$5,000 recited in real estate option agreement was not true consideration for option,
trial court could consider parol evidence to
disclose true meaning of provision in agreement referring to "other good and valuable
consideration."
6. Vendor and Purchaser <£=»44
Evidence established that execution of
documents conveying ranch and limited
partnership interest*, together with general tax structure of real estate transaction,
was intended consideration for real estate
option agreement
7. Vendor and Purchaser 4=>44
Evidence supported finding that original one-year option agreement was never
finalized and that agreement establishing

one and one-half-year option was not a new
agreement that required new consideration.
8. Contracts <e=103
Deeds «=*17(1)
Partnership «=*352
Finding that limited partnership agreement, purchase contract and special warranty deed were intended consideration for
option agreement did not impair validity of
partnership agreement, contract or deed.
9. Witnesses <s=>379(2)
Copies of option holder's handwritten
notes made during contract negotiations
were admissible for impeachment purposes
in an action challenging agreement's validity. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(dXlXA).
10. Interest «=>20
Option holder's assignee was entitled
to accruing interest on money deposited
with clerk of court after parties who gave
option refused tender of payment by assignee and retained possession of subject
real estate.
11. Interest «=>20
If party obligated to sell land retains
possession, forcing buyer to place funds on
deposit with court pending settlement of
action, then seller is not entitled to accrued
interest on deposited funds.
E. Craig Smay, Sessions & Moore, Salt
Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
William L. Fillmore, L. Brent Hoggan
(argued), Marlin J. Grant, Olson & Hoggan,
Logan, for plaintiff and respondent
Before BILLINGS, DAVIDSON and
GARFF, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellants John D. Archer and Elizabeth
B. Archer, both individually and as Trustees for the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust,
and Hubert Wolfe, Judy W. Wolfe, and
Elliott Wolfe, as Trustees for Elliott Wolfe
Trust No. 701 ("Archer" and/or "Wolfe"),
appeal from the trial court's judgment ordering specific performance of an option to
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buy land in favor of Respondent Ernest J.
Miller ("Miller"), and from the award of
accrued interest to Miller. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Miller's action for specific performance
against Archer and Wolfe arises out of an
earlier business relationship between Archer, Wolfe, and William J. Colman, the thirdparty defendant ("Colman"). Because it is
integral to our decision, we set out in detail
the factual background of this complex
transaction. On appeal, we view the facts
in the light most favorable to the trial
court's findings. See Security State Bank
v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 470-71 (Utah
1987).

achieve the tax advantages Archer and
Woffe sought: (1) a limited partnership interest; (2) the purchase of Anderson
Ranch; and (3) a one-year option to repurchase Anderson Ranch.
Before the documents were executed,
Archer and Wolfe agreed to give Colman a
one and one-half (IV2) year option, instead
of the original one-year option, for an increased total purchase price of $650,000,
and the documents reflect this change.

The Option states that it was given to
Colman "in consideration of the sum of
Five Thousand Dollars ($5000.00) and other
good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged."
Allen testified that the recital of "$5000.00
In the late summer or early fall of 1981, and other good and valuable consideration
Colman approached Archer and Wolfe for a the receipt of which is hereby acknowlloan of $750,000. Colman urgently needed edged" was inserted by him merely as a
the money to continue development of a legal shorthand for the true consideration.
business venture. Archer advised Colman He claimed the $5000 was never intended
that he and Wolfe were not interested in a to be the actual consideration for the Opsimple loan due to the adverse tax conse- tion and that is why the recital indicated
quences resulting from interest income, nor that $5000 had been paid. Allen claimed
would they invest the $750,000 amount re- that the real consideration for the Option
quested. Colman then offered Archer and was the execution of the limited partnerWolfe a limited partnership interest in a ship agreement, the Anderson Ranch
salt project known as "Carson Sink" in agreement, and the various tax benefits
Nevada ("limited partnership"), and an in- accruing to Archer and Wolfe by the structerest in "Anderson Ranch" which Colman turing of the deal.
owned.
Colman did not pay $5000 to Archer and
After consulting with their accountants
about the tax consequences, Archer and
Wolfe told Colman they would advance a
total of $500,000, on the condition that the
deal was structured as follows: (1) a $250,000 investment in the limited partnership,
providing research and development tax
write-offs, an interest in profits during the
life of the partnership, and an overriding
royalty thereafter, and (2) cash payment of
$250,000 as the purchase price of the
Anderson Ranch, coupled with a one-year
option under which Colman could repurchase the ranch for $600,000, allowing
Archer and Wolfe to treat the dollar return
as capital gain.
Frank J. ABen (" Allen"), Colman's attorney, drafted the documents according to
this plan. Allen structured the deal as
three separate transactions in order to

Wolfe for the Option. Archer and Wolfe
made various verbal inquiries regarding
payment, to which Colman responded he
did not believe he had to pay the $5000
based on the advice of Allen.
On November 2, 1982, Colman executed
a Real Estate Contract which assigned his
rights under the Option to Miller as Colman could not secure the $650,000 necessary to exercise the Option. Subsequently,
Archer and Wolfe received written notice
of this assignment and contacted Miller to
inform him that the $5000 for the Option
had never been paid by Colman. In addition, despite the lack of payment, Archer
stated that he and Wolfe were still willing
to sell the Anderson Ranch to Miller ^pr, a
purchase price of $655,000. Negotiations
for this sale occurred, but it was never
consummated.
* rf»
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On April 8, 1983, Archer and Wolfe attempted to revoke the Option. Subsequently, Miller, Colman and Allen met and
discussed the status of the Option and all
agreed that the $5000 was never intended
to be paid, but merely functioned as window-dressing. The true consideration consisted of the structuring of the transaction.
Allen and Colman executed affidavits to
this effect following this meeting.
On May 16, 1983, Miller filed this action
against Archer and Wolfe and a lis pendens
against the Anderson Ranch. Archer and
Wolfe later filed a third-party complaint
against Colman. On July 1, 1983, Miller
tendered to Archer and Wolfe his cashier's
check for $650,000 as an exercise of the
Option to purchase the Anderson Ranch.
The check was deposited in an interestbearing account, with entitlement to such
interest to be determined by the court.
Since Miller's July 1, 1983 tender, Archer
and Wolfe have held possession and all
rights of ownership to the Anderson
Ranch.
CONSIDERATION FOR OPTION
The primary issue on appeal is whether
the trial court correctly ruled that the attempted revocation of the Option was ineffective. The trial court found there was
adequate consideration to support the Option and therefore Miller was entitled to
specific performance. Over Archer's and
Wolfe's objections, the trial court admitted
parol evidence to ascertain the intended
consideration for the Option. On appeal,
Archer and Wolfe contend the consideration can be gleaned from the plain language of the Option and, therefore, the
trial court erred in admitting such evidence.1 We disagree.
11-3] Even if a written agreement appears to be completely integrated, parol
evidence is admissible to establish whether
there was consideration for a promise.
Soukop v. Snyder, 709 P.2d 109, 113 (Ha1. The contentions of Archer and Wolfe are inconsistent They argue the consideration can
be gleaned from the plain language of the Option. However, while making this argument,
they seem to ignore the plain language of the

waii CtApp.1985) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 218(2) (1981)). A
recital of consideration received is usually
intended merely as written acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment It is
inserted for convenience, usually because
the parties do not want to reveal the real
consideration. Paloni v. Beebe, 100 Utah
115, 118, 110 P.2d 563, 565 (1941) (quoting
9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2433 (3rd ed. 1981).
Therefore, the parol evidence rule does not
prevent a party from showing the actual
consideration when a nominal consideration
is recited. Wood v. Roberts, 586 P.2d 405,
407 (Utah 1978).
[4] There is substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the
recital of "$5000.00 and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged" in the Option was
nominal consideration inserted by the drafter of the agreement for convenience as the
parties did not wish to reveal in writing the
true consideration for the deal.
At trial, there was conflicting testimony
on the necessity of paying the $5000 to
Archer and Wolfe. Colman claimed he
knew that the $5000 was required to be
paid before he could exercise the Option.
However, Colman's testimony was contradicted by his own admissions on cross-examination, his deposition prior to trial, his
affidavit of May 2, 1983, and his contemporaneous handwritten notes. Allen testified
that he had consistently informed the parties that he had inserted the $5000 amount
on his own, intending it as a legal shorthand for the true consideration, and it was
not an item for which the parties bargained.
The trial court found Allen's testimony
more credible and consistent than Colman's, finding that the $5000 was never
intended to be paid. "[D]ue regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of witnesses."
Adams v. Gubler, 731 P.2d 494, 496 n. 3
Option which states that the receipt of the consideration is hereby acknowledged. We will not
view the language of the Option out of context
as urged by Archer and Wolfe.
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(Utah 1986) (quoting Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a)).
There is substantial evidence to support th^
determination of the trial court, and, thu$f
that finding must be sustained. Saiher t>%
Pitcher, 73 Utah Adv.Rep. 85, 86, 748 P.2<J
191 (Utah CtApp.1987).
[5] The trial court found the true cor\,
sideration for the Option was embodied i^
the phrase "other good and valuable cor*,
sideration." Because of its ambiguity, th^
trial court considered parol evidence to di$.
close its true meaning. "[W]hen a contract
is ambiguous, because of the uncertain
meaning of terms, missing terms, or othe*»
facial deficiencies, parol evidence is admi%.
sible to explain the parties' intent*'
Faulkner v. Famsworth, 665 P.2d 1292,
1293 (Utah 1983); Colonial Leasing Co. v%
Larsen Bros. Const, 731 P.2d 483, 487
(Utah 1986). In such a determination, w^
defer to the finder of fact Craig Fooq
Indus., Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 28$
(Utah Ct.App.1987); Faulkner v. Farns.
worth, 665 P.2d at 1293; Winegar t\
Smith Inv. Co., 590 P.2d 348, 350 (Utal*
1979).
[6] The trial court considered the testiL
mony of the parties and found that thi^
phrase referred to the execution of th^
various documents conveying the Anderson
Ranch and limited partnership interests^
and the general tax structuring of the tota)
transaction. The trial court looked at th^
substance of the parties' entire dealings
and found that the structuring of the total
commitments was the intended considereu
tion for the Option. We cannot say thi^
was error. Sather v. Pitcher, 73 Utal\
Adv.Rep. at 86, 748 P.2d 191.
[7] Archer and Wolfe also contend that
the one and one-half (1%) year option was a
new agreement, executed after the original
one-year option, and therefore required
new consideration. We disagree. The
facts support the trial court's finding that
the original one-year option was never finalized. The original consideration supported the one and one-half (Vk) year option.
[8] The trial court's finding that there
was sufficient consideration to support the

Option does not invalidate any of the other
agreements, as Archer and Wolfe claim.
The Option, limited partnership agreement,
purchase contract and special warranty
deed are in no way impaired and are still
valid and enforceable agreements within
the context of the larger transaction, as the
parties intended. The trial court merely
found the execution of these other agreements was the intended consideration for
the Option.
COLMAN'S HANDWRITTEN NOTES
[9] Archer and Wolfe claim the trial
court committed reversible error in admitting copies of Colman'8 handwritten notes;
made during the course of the negotiations
between him and Archer and Wolfe. The
notes conflicted with Colman's trial testimony. The trial court found that, although
the notes' were not totally legible,' partially
cut off by the copier, and stapled together
by Miller's attorneys, they did provide a
certain narrative flow and consistency that
gave them substantial credibility. These
notes were properly admitted for impeachment purpdses. Schocker v. Milton 0. Bitner Co., 30 Utah 2d 173, 176, 514 P.2d
1290,
1292 (1973);
Utah
R.Evid.
801(dXlXA). Furthermore, the admission
of the notes was duplicative of other competent evidence that impeached Colman's
trial testimony, including Colman's prior
deposition and affidavit
INTEREST
[101 Archer and Wolfe also challenge
the award of accrued interest to Miller.
The trial court concluded that Miller was
entitled to the accruing interest on the
$650,000 deposited with the clerk of tKe
court after Archer and Wolfe refused the
tender by Miller and retained possession of
Anderson Ranch.
t i l ] Common law and equity require
that if a party obligated to sell land retains
possession, forcing the buyer to plac#
funds on deposit with the court pending
settlement of the action, then the selleFis*
not entitled to the accrued interest on \f&
deposited funds. Rasmussen v. Moe, 188

STATE v.
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CaLApp.2d 499, 292 P.2d 226, 230 (2 Dist
1956); Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So.2d 770,
771-772 (Fla.1961). The trial court's finding that Archer and Wolfe had enjoyed
possession and all rights of ownership of
the Anderson Ranch since Miller's July 1,
1983 tender of the $650,000 necessary to
exercise the Option was supported by substantial evidence. Archer and Wolfe retained all rents and profits paid for grazing
use of the land by third parties. In contrast, Miller received no commercial benefit
from the Anderson Ranch. What limited
and sporadic recreational use Miller has
had of the ranch has been without objection
by Archer and Wolfe, and similar to that
traditionally enjoyed by many others in the
area.
Affirmed.

Costs to Miller.

DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ.f concur.

L. Brent Hoggan
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone; 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
ERNEST J. MILLER,

)
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)
)
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH
)
B. ARCHER, both individually and )
as Trustees for the Elizabeth
)
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT
)
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT )
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott
)
Wolfe Trust No. 701,
)
Defendants.

JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH
|B. ARCHER, both individually and
las Trustees for the Elizabeth
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott
Wolfe Trust No. 701,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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Third-Party Plaintiffs, )
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vs.

)
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V

WILLIAM J. COLMAN,

)

,

)

ON & HOGGAN
ORNEYS AT LAW
> WEST CENTER

Third-Party Defendant.
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,AN UTAH 8432 1
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-2THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the above[entitled Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call

District Judge,

presiding and sitting without a jury- on September 18, 19, 20. 27,
(October 3, November 14, and December 17, 1985- and Plaintiff
paving been represented by its counsel of record, L. Brent Hoggan,
{of Olson & Hoggan, and the Defendants having been represented by
their counsel of record, E. Craig Smay. and the Third-Party
Defendant, knowingly, voluntarily and after discussing the same
|with the Court, having been represented by himself- and the Court
[having heard testimony from witnesses for -a 11 the parties hereto,
and having received and accepted certain exhibits offered by the
parties as evidence in the matter* and the Court having received
trial briefs from counsel for both Plaintiff and the Defendants on
[the primary issues before the Court- and the Court having made and
jentered its written Memorandum Decision herein, and having
[reviewed and considered Plaintiff's proposed Findings, Conclusions
and Judgment and Defendants1 Objections thereo* and being fully
advised in the premises, THE COURT DOES NOW MAKE AND ENTER THE
FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The real property which is the subject of this action by

Plaintiff for specific performance of a purchase option relating
to said property is a composite of several semi-contiguous parcels
of undeveloped land and appurtenant water rights located Southeast
jof Paradise. Utah, comprising in the whole 1840.14 acres, more or
jless, primarily used for cattle grazing and recreation, and
generally known and referred to hereinafter as the "Anderson
JRanch'1, which property is located totally within the boundaries of
Cache County. Utah, and more particularLy described as follows
J 8c HOGGAN
NEYS AT LAW
EST CENTER
BOX 525
UTAH 84321
)7521551

Parcel I: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarterthe South half of the Northeast quarter - the Southeast
quarter of the Northwest quarter- the East half of the
Southeast quarter* the Northwest quarter of the Southwest

-3quarter of Section 26- the North half of the
Northwest quarter- the Southwest quarter of the Southeast
quarter of Section 25- the Northeast quarter of the
Northeast quarter; the Northeast quarter of the Southeast
quarter- the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter: the
South half of the Southwest quarter of Section 24- the
Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 23* in
Township 10 North, Range 3 East. Salt Lake Base and MeridianLots 2, 3 and 4- the Southeast quarter of the Southwest
quarter* the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter- and
the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 19
Township 10 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
Parcel 2: The West half of the Southeast quarter and the
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26. Township 10
North. Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 3- The Northeast quarter • the Southeast quarter of
tKe" Northwest quarter; th e North east quarter of the Southwest
quarter- the Northwest qu arter o f the Southeast quarter of
Section 19, the East half of the Nort heast quarter; and the
North half of the Southea st quarter o f Section 30, in
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of th e Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Also the South west qu arter of Section 25, and the
Southwest quarter of the Northwest qu arter of Section 26,
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
Parcel 4: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter* and the Southeast
quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 10
North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
to the aboveTogether with all water rights /at>mrrt^tnmit
/appxxrrt
described property.

2. The Plaintiff herein, Ernest Junior Miller (hereinafter
"MilLer"), is a resident of Cache County, Utah. The Defendants
named herein, both as individuals and as trustees, John D. Archer
(hereinafter "Archer"), Elizabeth B. Archer, Elliott Wolfe
(hereinafter "Wolfe"), Hubert Wolfe and Judy W. Wolfe, are all
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. The Third-Party Defendant
herein, William J. Colman (hereinafter "Colman"), is also a

I & HOGGAN
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OC:Ck

-4resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.

Miller, Colman, Archer

and Wolfe are men of considerable business experience and acumen,
particuarly in matters of cattle raising and beef fabrication
(Miller), mining, oil and gas (Colman and Archer) and real estate
(Archer, Wolfe and Colman). ^Af^chtrc and 'Wolfe arc men of

<^\

een^irfe^abXo f inanri^H^ljB?raTTC^.
3.

Colman is a shareholder and President of Royalty

Investment Corporation, also known as Royalty Investment Company
(hereinafter "Royalty11) , a Utah corporation.

Most, if not all, of

the balan9e<r-of Jkoyal^y* ^ stock, i ^ owned by Colman's relatives: and
the company is. within Colman s effective control. Colman acquire
the Anderson Ranch for Royalty ha^BSST by purchasing E. H. Cameron
and H. C. Anderson's rights (as Buyers) under a June 1961 Contract
of Sale with LaMar Anderson and Lucille Anderson (as Sellers).
4.

In the late Summer or early Fall of 1981, Colman ap-

proached Defendant Archer for a loan of $750,000.00, money which
Colman urgently needed to continue development of the Carson Sink
salt project (certain mineral rights and evaporation ponds used
for commercial salt production located in Nevada).

Said mineral

project was owned by Owanah Oil Corporation, of which Colman was
President, and was in serious financial trouble due, at least in
i

.

ipart.
]

.

.

to excessive precipitation
5.

Subsequently,

.

.

.

in t h e

past.

Archer a d v i s e d Colman t h a t Archer

and

1

J W o l f e , w i t h whom Archer had d i s c u s s e d C o l m a n ' s o f f e r ,
were n o t
i n t e r e s t e d in a s i m p l e loan and were not i n t e r e s t e d in i n v e s t i n g
•Ac clMcu/jT
^G-fug-treid
CL4V6A/£<
sgg^B&tgm $600 ?QQQ* Oft in any e v e n t .
Colman s u g g e s t e d t h a t £fci±
ffismaJcier
ammmX-y-^ffi
c o u l d be s e c u r e d by t h e Anderson
i Ranch (indicating that Colman. at least, believed the ranch had
|that much value).
i

The possibility of a limited partnership

; interest in the Carson Sink salt project was also discussed.
4 & HOGGAN
INEYS AT LAW
EST CENTER
i BOX 5 2 5
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i

6.

Based upon these preliminary discussions. Colman had his

i long-time attorney, Frank J. Allen, of Salt Lake City. Utah
(hereinafter "Allen11) , prepare a document (Exhibit 1) by which

)752-1551

Archer and Wolfe would invest $600,000.00 in a limited partnership
for the Carson Sink project, which investment Colman would secure

-5with a Trust Deed on the Anderson Ranch.

Said document was

never executed.
7.

Subsequently, and after considering certain tax savings

possibilities with their accountants, Archer and Wolfe advised
Colman that they were only interested in advancing Colman
$500,000.00 total for his salt project, and this on condition that
the $500,000.00 be structured to appear by record as an investment
of $250,000.00 in a limited partnership on the salt project,
providing tax write-offs for research and development expenses,
and an interest in profits during the life of the partnership and
an overriding royalty thereafter; and with the other $250,000.00
to be shown as the purchase price for the Anderson Ranch, coupled
with a one-year option in Colman to reacquire the Ranch for
$600,000.00, which would permit Defendants to treat the difference
as a capital gain.

Archer, Wolfe and Colman reached an agreement

in principle on this arrangement, and Defendants accepted Colman1s
suggestion that Allen draw up the necessary papers to document the
deal.
8.

In October and/or November of 1981, Archer, Wolfe and

Colman met with Allen at the latter1s office on at least two
separate occasions, first to discuss their agreement and later to
execute the documents prepared by Mr. Allen pursuant to their
instructions.

AlLen was advised by Archer, Wolfe and Colman that,

although the primary purpose of the arrangement was to get
$500,000.00 to Colman for his salt project, they wanted the deal
structured such that it would appear as three separate
transactions (i.e., the limited partnership, the purchase of the

<ti

n

ranch, and the option back on the ranch), aO-ja£--t*rHHg33ze^
n:^^3B3rr^^i=afc§- and secure Archer and Wolfe all the tax
advantages they were seeking.

I & HOGGAN
NEYS AT LAW

The structure of the deal was not

so critical to Colman as securing the $500,000.00 from the
Defendants, as long as he had an opportunity to get the Anderson
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Ranch back.

The different dates on the various documents were

largely irrelevant to him.

He was in great need of the money and
004 <

-6was willing to use the various resources within his control to
consummate a deal any way he could.
9.

Pursuant to the directions received from Archer, Wolfe

and Colman, Allen prepared the Certificate and Agreement of
Limited Partnership of Solar Chemical Company, for Archer and
Wolfe's $250,000.00 contribution to the salt project (Exhibit 3,
hereinafter the "Limited Partnership Agreement"), the Contract for
Purchase of Real Property, for the purchase by Defendants of the
Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00 (Exhibit 4, hereinafter the
"Contract"), the Special Warranty Deed from Royalty to the
Defendants (Exhibit 5 ) , and an option from Defendants to Colman to
permit him to repurchase the Anderson Ranch for $600,000.00.
Subsequently, the parties agreed to give Colman an option on the
Anderson Ranch for 1-1/2 years for a purchase price of $650,000.00
(Exhibit 8, hereinafter the "Option").

The original one (l)-year

option for $600,000.00 was never executed by the parties.
10.

The Limited Partnership Agreement establishing Solar

Chemical Company was dated October 15, 1981, as was Archer's
initial check to Owanah Oil Corporation, the General Partner in
Solar Chemical Company, for $50,000.00 (Exhibit 23). Colman was a
shareholder and President of Owanah, which company apparently was
within his effective control.
11.

The Limited Partnership Agreement provided for periodic

contributions by the Limited Partners. Archer and Wolfe, totaLling
$250,000.00, and states that Archer and Wolfe were each to receive
a five percent (5%) share in Solar Chemical's net profits over
three (3) years and that each would receive a one-half of one
percent (#8#5%) overriding royalty thereafter on all sodium saLts
recovered from the project.
12.
4 & HOGGAN
NEYS AT LAW

The Contract between Royalty (signed by Colman, as

President), as Seller, and Archer, Archer's wife and Wolfe, as the
sole named Trustee of ElLiott Wolfe Trust 701 (hereinafter the
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"Wolfe Trust"), as Purchasers, was an executory contract for the
sale of the Anderson Ranch to the Defendants, specifying January
4, 1982 as the closing date. It was dated November 9, 1981,
as was Wolfe's check to Rov^lt-v f ^ * > AA ^ '*- • ••

-713.

The Special Warranty Deed conveying the Anderson Ranch

from Royalty (again signed by Colman, as President), to the
Defendants was dated January 4, 1982 (Exhibit 5 ) . Said Special
Warranty Deed, as well as the Contract and the Option, all contain
a scrivinor's error in the legal description of the Anderson
Ranch, mistakenly and unintentionally referencing Township 10
South, instead of Township 10 North, in Parcel 3 thereof.

No

evidence was received (or offered) suggesting that Colman acted
without authority in executing the Contract, the Special Warran
Deed or subsequent deeds as President of Royalty Investment
Corporation.
14.

The documents^ffffftFaa:

tfalid'a

A

The Option from the Defendants to Colman was dated March

of 1982 (viz, "this

day of March, 1982").

The purpose of

said Option was to allow Colman the right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2, 1983 for $650,000.00.

It was

executed by Archer, Mrs. Archer and Wolfe in their individual and
respective trustee capacities.

T&eir execution of Hie Qpllotf- ^ *

coxi^e^pnTKhs—pr~et:isely with how they rook cirle to tne Anderson
15.

All of the aforereferenced documents, Exhibits 3, 4, 5

and 8, were prepared at or about the same time by Frank Allen,
pursuant to the instructions of the parties, as part of a unified,
integrated transaction.

They were all executed by the parties on

the same date, most likely on or about November 9, 1981, as
indicated on the back of said check.
16.

Although Colman was in debt and had an acute need for

funds to continue his salt project, Archers' check to Owanah Oil
in the amount of $50,000.00, dated October 15, 1981 (Exhibit 23),
was not cashed by Colman until on or about November 10, 1981, as
indicated on the back of said check.
17.

Colman and his attorney, Allen, required a simultaneous

execution of the documents, particularly the Contract, the
1 & HOGGAN I

original. Special Warranty Deed and the Option, in order to assure
that Colman was protected as to his right to reacquire the
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The Court finds it probable that

Archer, likewise, was unwilling to part with his first check for
$50,000.00 prior to securing the DofonH^nt-o« «~,,-.•#--•-- ..---i

£

-8Limited Partnership Agreement, Contract and Option be executed
at the same time so that Colman would not be deeding away the
Anderson Ranch without a right to repurchase the same-

Such an

entitlement was always part of the parties' agreement and
essential to Colman1s willingness to enter into the related
transactions.

Colman was promised that right to repurchase the

Ranch as part of the total deal and relied on that promise in
executing the deed conveying the Ranch to Defendants.
18.

Elliott Wolfe represented to Colman and Allen that he

had authority to sign any agreement for his trust and intended
that his signature bind the trust and that Colman and Allen rely
thereon; and Colman and Allen did rely upon his representation and
signature.

Mrs.

Archer's signature was secured the same day that

the other parties signed the Option, or the very next day.

The

Option was then delivered by Archer, either that same day or the
next day, to Colman.
19.

Allen never received a copy of the Wolfe Trust agreement

from Wolfe (nor was it produced at trial): nor did the other
ostensible trustees to the Wolfe Trust, Hubert Wolfe and Judy
Wolfe, ever notify Colman, Allen or Miller that they objected to
Wolfe's binding the Trust by his signature alone- nor did Wolfe
seriously claim that he lacked authority to bind the Wolfe Trust.
20.

The Option reads that it was given to Colman "in

consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and
other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged".

This recital of $3,000.00 and the "other good and

valuable consideration" came from Allen, who had also inserted the
same figure in the original, one-year, $600,000.00 option to
Colman, which was never executed.

The fictitious $5,000.00

consideration was carried over to the Option (Exhibit 8 ) , which
reflects the parties' agreement to give Colman an option for 1-1/2
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years for an additional $50,000.00 (total: $650,000.00), which
Option was executed.
21.

Said $5,000.00 was never intended by the parties to be

paid. It was merely window-dressing which Allen pulled out of the
air and inserted to give credence to th& H^^..—-*- -~

Defendants acknowledged receipt of the same, even though they
had not actually received $5,000.00, because they all knew it was
not to be paid.
of the

The real consideration for the Option consisted

fl

other good and valuable consideration", which included the

conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty Deed from
Royalty to the Defendants, the $650,000.00 to be paid for the
Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the Limited
Partnership benefits as to profit sharing and the overriding
royalty, and the various tax benefits accruing to the Defendants
by structuring the total transaction their way.

The Court finds

that it was never the intent of the parties at the time the Option
was granted that $5,000.00 was the consideration for the Option,
or that the $5,000.00 would, in fact, ever be paid.
22.

The Court notes that the Option on its face and by its

terms gives the Defendants no right of revocation.

There are no

restrictions on its face as to its assignability by Colman to
third parties, nor is there any language suggesting the Option was
strictly personal to Colman.
23.

Within a week after November 15, 1981, the date of a

title commitment from Northern Title Company (Exhibit 64), said
report was mailed to Colman or Allen by said title company.

This

title report, among other things, disclosed an error in the legal
description of the Anderson Ranch, as set forth in paragraph 13 of
these Findings.

Two Special Warranty Deeds (Exhibits 6 and 7)

were subsequently prepared for the purpose of conveying the
Anderson Ranch from Royalty to the Defendants with the necessary
correction to the legal description (i.e., changing "Township 10
South" to "Township 10 North" for Parcel 3 ) . They were dated
January 4, 1982, and recorded by Allen on January 7, 1982.

The

new Special Warranty Deed for the Wolfe interest (Exhibit 7) in
the Anderson Ranch was conveyed to "Elliott Wolfe, Trustee of the
Elliott Wolfe Trust No. 701", and so recorded, without any
I & HOGGAN
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reference to co-trustees.
24.

On January 22, 1982, a Correction of Correction Deed

(Exhibit 45) was executed by Lucille Anderson to Royalty, and
thereafter recorded to correct the error contained in the

10legal description of the 1980 deed from her and her husband to
Royalty for the Anderson Ranch.
25.
Option.

Colman never paid $5,000.00 to the Defendants for the
Neither Archer nor Wolfe ever made any written request to

Colman to pay the $5,000.00.

When Archer made his first verbal

inquiry regarding payment of the $5,000.00, which may have been
sometime in March, 1982, Colman told him that he did not believe
he had to pay the $5,000.00.

When Colman contacted Allen, Allen

reaffirmed for him that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be
paid and advised Colman against paying it, inasmuch as the
consideration supporting the total deal was comprised of those
considerations set forth hereinabove at Finding 22.

Allen

consistently advised Colman, Archer, Wolfe and Plaintiff that the
parties to the Option never intended for Colman to pay the
$5,000.00.
26.

Colman never conceded that he owed the $5,000.00.
The Defendants1 later assertions that Colman1s

non-payment of the $5,000.00 rendered the Option invalid and
unenforceable lacks credibility , This Court finds that
Defendants
th^j^H^A^n
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It

was

never

agreed or intended that Colman was to pay $5,000.00 to the
Defendants.

The number recited was fictitious, which is why the

Defendants signed the Option acknowledging their receipt of that
sum, as well as their receipt of the Mother good and valuable
consideration", which phrase circumscribed the true consideration
for the Option.

The Defendants1 testimony as to their purported

negotiations, renegotiations and the calculations which they
allege resulted in the $5,000.00 consideration for the Option is
contradicted not only by Allen's testimony and Colman1s Affidavit,
but by Defendant's own pleadings (viz., paragraph 4 of their
Third-Party Complaint).
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1127.

The Defendants represented to Colman and his attorney

that Colman would have a right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch.
Defendants intended that Colman and his attorney should rely on
those representations and upon the sufficiency of the Option, as
executed.

Colman and his attorney did rely on those

representations and on the Option as executed.
1

Defendants

In light of

subsequent repudiation of the Option, that reliance

was to Colman1s detriment.
28.

Archer and Wolfe never visited the Anderson Ranch or the

Carson Sink salt project until the Spring of 1982.

They never

checked the title to the Carson Sink properties, nor did they ever
verify the water rights appurtenant to the Anderson Ranch, until
the Spring of 1982.

The Defendants never secured title insurance

on the Anderson Ranch.
29.

The overriding royalty rights in the Carson Sink which

the Limited Partnership Agreement states will be assigned to
Archer and Wolfe had not been assigned to them or recorded by them
at the time of trial, four (4) years after the Limited Partnership
Agreement was executed.

No profits have ever been paid out by

Solar Chemical to Archer or Wolfe.
30.

The price purportedly paid for the Anderson Ranch by

Defendants to Royalty ($250,000.00), and the price which Colman
was to pay Defendants to reacquire the Anderson Ranch under the
Option only eighteen (18) months later ($650,000.00), cannot, as a
matter of reason, stand alone.

The property was professionally

appraised (See Exhibit 59) for $427,240.00 ten (10) years prior to
the sale by Colman to the Defendants.

Moreover, even if the

Anderson Ranch was worth only $250,000.00 on January 4, 1982, the
Court cannot believe that Colman had a reasonable expectation that
the market value of the Anderson Ranch would be 2607o of its prior
I & HOGGAN
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-12price he could for the ranch at the time, it was admitted that
Colman, who had known for several years that Miller was interested
in acquiring the Anderson Ranch or an interest therein, never
contacted Miller to see if he would be interested in bidding more
than $250,000.00 for it.

These prices make sense only when viewed

in the context of the layer, unified transaction.
31.

Although it is not strictly necessary to its decision,

the Court finds that the $650,000.00 purchase price for Colman1s
exercise of the Option more truly corresponds to a twenty percent
(20%) return on a composite $500,000.00 secured investment by
Defendants in Colman's salt project for one and one-half (1-1/2)
years.

The total transaction was the functional equivalent of a

secured loan ($500,000.00 loaned by Defendants to Colman for 1-1/2
years at 20% interest, secured by the Anderson Ranch in case he
failed to repay them), dressed up so as to give Archer and Wolfe
certain additional incentives and to secure the Defendants various
tax advantages (e.g., the tax write-off for their investment in
Solar Chemical was worth a minimum to Archer and Wolfe of
$60,000.00 -- See Exhibit 11).
32.
Allen.

The Court finds much credibility in the testimony of
His recollections under oath are entitled to great weight.

He was the only witness to the original negotiations and the
preparation and execution of the central documents who was not a
party to the same.

He has no interest in the Anderson Ranch or

the outcome of this litigation.

Judging by his own testimony, and

that of the Plaintiff, John Clay and John Miller, and Allen's own
April 29, 1983 Affidavit (Exhibit 27), his statements have been
consistent from the beginning with respect to the true nature of
the parties1 integrated transaction and the Option, in particular.
If Allen's testimony were to be biased, one would reasonably
I & HOGGAN
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33.

By contrast, the testimony of Bill Colman at trial, when

measured against his admissions on cross-examination, and the
contradictions contained in his prior deposition, his Affidavit of
May 2, 1983 (Exhibit 28), and his handwritten notes (Exhibits 54,
55 and 56), convince the Court that his testimony at trial is
entitled to very little weight or credibility.

Although Colman!s

Affidavit and handwritten notes are not strictly necessary to the
Court's decision herein, they represent a more reliable index of
the true history and intention of the parties than his trial
testimony several years later and also serve to seriously impeach
his trial testimony.

His affidavit was signed under oath at a

time when the relevant facts were much fresher in his memory than
at trial, when his recollection of several matters was
insufficient or non-existent.

When Plaintiff's counsel presented

him with Exhibits 54, 55 and 56, Colman expressed considerable
surprise, alarm and anger, but admitted subsequently that they
were copies of his own handwritten notes which he then read for
the Court.

Although the notes are not totally legible, are

partially cut off by the copier (particularly Exhibit 54), and
were stapled together by Plaintifffs attorneys, they are for the
most part dated, reference Defendants Archer and Wolfe and have a
certain narrative flow and consistency that gives them substantial
credibility.

Any undue surprise to Defendants was overcome by the

several days interval they had to inspect the Exhibits after their
introduction and before Colmanfs testimony on the same.

The

demeanor of all the witnesses was significant to the Court during
this trial.
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34.

In the late Spring or early Summer of 1982, Miller

learned from Archer and Wolfe that they had obtained an interest
in the Anderson Ranch.

Subsequently, either in August or

J September of 1982, Miller discussed the status of the Anderson
I Ranch with Colman, who represented to Miller that Archer and
j Wolfe's interest in the Anderson Ranch was in the nature of a
security interest.

At the same time, Colman indicated a desire to

J sell his rights in the Anderson Ranch to Miller.
|

35.

Plaintiff's attorney, William L. Fillmore, of Logan,

I Utah, (hereinafter "Fillmore"), thereafter communicated with both
|i Colman and Allen and received from them copies of the documents
I covering the prior integrated transaction between Colman and the
j Defendants, including receipt from Colman of the Option with
(original signatures of John Archer, Elizabeth Archer and Elliott
jl Wolfe, and an original notarization by Carole Lake.

The

!correspondence between Fillmore, Allen and Colman (Exhibits 68,
69, 70 and 71) and testimony at trial indicate the preparation of
a draft Real Estate Contract by Fillmore, Allen and Colman's
ij review of the same, negotiations (including one meeting at the
i| Salt Lake Airport between Colman, Miller, Fillmore and John
(Miller, the Plaintiff's nephew), and the modification of the
original draft.
|j

36.

On November 2, 1982, Colman and Allen met Plaintiff,

J Fillmore and John Miller at the Salt Lake Airport to review and
(execute the revised Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9, hereinafter
the "Real Estate Contract") between Colman and Miller.

After

Colman and Allen reviewed the same, Colman and Miller then
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1982.

Pursuant to the contractual obligation contained therein.

Miller paid the $1,000.00 consideration to Colman in December,
1982.
37.

The Real Estate Contract assigned all of Colman1s rights

under the Option to Miller, granting Miller an independent right
to exercise the Option and acquire 100% of the Anderson Ranch on
or before June 18, 1982.
38.

Colman knowingly, voluntarily and with advice of counsel

warranted in the Real Estate Contract to Miller that

,f

the Option

is valid and enforcable and, further, that it is freely assignable
in its entirety without the consent or approval of any third
party."
39.

As part of the Real Estate Contract, Miller gave Colman

a new and independent option to reacquire from Miller (if Miller
exercised the Option) , on or before July 2, 1983, all of the
Anderson Ranch by paying Plaintiff $650,000.00 on or before that
date (See Exhibit 9, para. 4.a.), and a second option to
reacquire, after July 2, 1983 and on or before July 2, 1984, up to
a 507o interest in the Anderson Ranch by paying his prorated share
of the purchase price, plus interest, taxes and improvements (See
para. 4.b.).

Plaintiff and Colman agreed that the Real Estate

Contract was not assignable by either party without the other
party's prior written consent (See paras. 4.e. and f.).
40.

Also as part of the Real Estate Contract, the parties

granted each other a mutual and reciprocal right of first refusal
with respect to either party's subsequent proposed sale of any of
their rights or interests in the Anderson Ranch, and specified a
thirty (30) day period in which to exercise the same after receipt
of written notice from the selling party, accompanied by a copy of
the duly executed contract of sale (See para. 5 ) .
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At the November 2, 1982 meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah.!

whereat the Real Estate Contract was executed, it was observed
that Carole Lake, who had notarized the Option, had failed to fill
in the blank ("March
\ original Opt ion•

, 198211) in the notary's paragraph of the

Colman volunteered to have her correct this and

I referred to the omission as a simple oversight.

Subsequently, Ms.

Lake did fill in the blank with the number "1" and the Option was
returned to Fillmore by Colman for recording with the Real Estate i
Contract, which recordings were effected in Cache County on
December 20, 1982.
I

42.

After Archer and Wolfe received written notice from

Miller's attorney, Fillmore, of Colman's assignment of his Option i
[rights to Plaintiff, Archer called Fillmore on or about January 4,
j 1983 and told Fillmore, among other things, that the $5,000.00 for
the Option had never been paid by Colman.

Nonetheless, Archer

indicated that Defendants were still willing to sell the Anderson
Ranch to Plaintiff if he would pay $655,000.00.
j

43.

During January and February of 1983, Archer, Wolfe and

Fillmore engaged in negotiations for Miller's purchase of the

i

i Anderson Ranch: but the sale was never consummated because the
[parties could not agree upon terms, and because Miller was seeking
j a guaranty from Colman that he would not exercise his rights
under paragraph 4.a. in order to ensure that Miller would not

I

i incur substantial financing costs in vain.
44.

j

On April 8, 1983, the Defendants attempted to revoke the I

Option by a letter to Colman from the Defendants' prior attorney, j
Gregory P. Williams (Exhibit 15), wherein said attorney advised,

j

based upon his clients' position that "no consideration was given j
for the Option", that "the offer has been withdrawn".
45.
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On April 15, 1983, Colman, Allen, Plaintiff, Fillmore,

John Miller and John Clay (an employee and financial adviser of

j
j

Plaintiff) met at Allen's office to confirm what Allen and Colman J
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-17had represented previously as to the history and intent behind the
Option given Colman by the Defendants, in light of Archer and
Wolfe's position on the $5,000.00 and what appeared to be a
probability of litigation over the same.

Colman and Allen

reaffirmed at that meeting to Plaintiff and his attorney and
employees that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be paid, but
was a number pulled out of the air by Allen as he prepared the
documents; that Wolfe represented that he had full authority to
sign the Option for his trust: and that the series of documented
transactions (the Limited Partnership, the Contract, the Special
Warranty Deed(s) and the Option), were all part of one, unified,
integrated scheme which was basically intended to get $500,000.00
to Colman for his salt project, secure the repayment of the same
with the Anderson Ranch and guaranty Colman the right to reacquire
the ranch upon his payback of the $500,000.00 plus a $150,000.00
premium on the same, structured in a way to give Defendants
additional incentives and secure certain tax benefits important to
them -- all of which comprised the true consideration for the
deal.

Allen and Colman agreed to give Plaintiff their Affidavits

to this effect.
46.

At the April 15, 1983 meeting in Salt Lake City, Colman

also indicated his willingness, after consulting further with
Allen, to sign a Waiver and Release similar to the one previously
requested by Plaintiff in February, 1983 (See Exhibit 34), because
Colman was in no position to purchase the Anderson Ranch before
July 2, 1983 and wanted Miller to buy it so that he (Colman) could
at least have a shot at acquiring a partial interest on or before
July 2, 1984.
47.

On April 19, 1983, Colman signed a Waiver and Release

for Miller's benefit, which Waiver and Release was subsequently
recorded in Cache County on April 20, 1983 (Exhibit 10,
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hereinafter the "Waiver and Release11) .

The intent of Colman and

Miller with the Waiver and Release was to give Miller the
unqualified right, without any fear that Colman would attempt to

903

18reacquire 100% of the Ranch, to exercise the Option and
acquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2, 1983, thereby (a)
guarantying Plaintiff, by Colman1s waiver of his paragraph 4.a.
option rights, that Plaintiff, at the very least, would be the
owner of 507o of the Anderson Ranch (even if Colman were to
exercise his option under paragraph 4.b. subsequently), (b)
eliminating the June 18, 1983 deadline for Miller's exercise of
the Option, because Colman was not in a position to exercise his
rights under the Option or the Real Estate Contract by July 2,
1983, and he wanted Miller to do so, and (c) assuring Colman that
he would later be able to exercise his 507o option reserved under
paragraph 4.b. if he could come up with the money on or before
July 2, 1984, because Miller's ownership of the ranch would then
make the paragraph 4.b. option possible.

This mutual intent is

clearly reflected by the language contained in the Waiver and
Release: (viz., "...which Waiver and Release is executed by the
undersigned in order to induce said Ernest Junior Miller to
exercise his rights under the aforesaid Real Estate Contract and
purchase the subject property on or before July 2, 1983, without
fear of any claim of right by William J. Colman to repurchase the
same from Ernest J. Miller, except as to William J. Colman's
reserved right to purchase up to a 50% interest in the subject
property after July 2, 1983 and before July 2, 1984.").

(Emphasi

added.)
48.

Colman induced Miller to exercise the Option, making it

clear that he had until July 2, 1983 to do so. for Colman1s
benefit as well as Miller's.

Because Colman, at that point, had

to rely on Miller's ability to purchase the ranch, he extended
Miller's time to exercise the Option until July 2, 1983, and
reserved only his right to reacquire up to 50% the next year.

It

would have been irrational, given his financial circumstances and
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(and against his own best interests) limit the time for Miller to
exercise the Option.

The purpose of the Waiver and Release was
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further corroborated by Colman's subsequent conduct after its

-19execution (i.e., no objection) and by Miller's conduct in
reliance thereon (i.e., its execution on July 1). The Court also
notes that the Defendants were not parties to the Waiver and
Release, nor were they privy to Colman and Miller's intent
regarding the same.
49.

No consideration is stated on the face of the Waiver and

Release, but the Court finds from the testimony at trial that it
was given by Colman in exchange for Miller's assurance that he
would exercise the Option, guarantying Colman another year to
acquire a partial interest in the ranch, and as additional
consideration, for Miller's promise to Colman that he would not
have to pay interest on any exercise of his paragraph 4.b. option
and that, in any event, Colman would be entitled to use the
property for recreational purposes for the rest of his life.
50.

Following a review of two draft affidavits prepared by

Fillmore, Allen prepared his own Affidavit (Exhibit 27), signed
and had it notarized on April 29, 1983.

Allen spent the better

part of the morning on May 2, 1983 with Colman, preparing and
modifying his draft of Colman's Affidavit (Exhibit 28), which was
reviewed and discussed by them paragraph-by-paragraph, amended by
them, and then executed by Colman and notarized by Allen's
secretary, all on the same day.
51.

On April 18, 1983, Plaintiff called Archer and offered

to pay $650,000.00 to the Defendants for the Anderson Ranch under
the Option.

Archer indicated that he would have to visit with

Wolfe before responding.

On April 20, 1983, Archer called Miller

back and informed him of the Defendants' rejection of Miller's
offer of $650,000.00 for the Anderson Ranch, indicating that
Defendants did not want to sell the property.
52.

In April of 1983, Archer and Wolfe attempted to persuade

Colman to exercise his option rights under paragraph 4.a. of the
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the property to a third party, and cut Plaintiff out (See Exhibits
2, 56 and 74). They were subsequently advised by Allen,

-20however

that the Waiver and Release which Colman had signed

for Miller*s benefit made such an attempt to prevent Miller

from

acquiring the ranch illegal.
53.

On May 16, 1983, Plaintiff filed this action against the

Defendants and a Lis Pendens against the Anderson Ranch.
24, 1983, the Defendants filed their Answer.

On June

Defendants filed

their Third-Party Complaint against Colman on June 30, 1983, and
then filed their Amended Answer and Counterclaim against Plaintiff
on July 1, 1983.
54.

On or about June 27 or 28, 1983, Fillmore called E.

Craig Smay, of Salt Lake City, Utah, the Defendants' attorney
(hereinafter nSmayfl) , to determine the best way to make the formal
tender of the $650,000.00 to the Defendants under the Option in
the context of this pending litigation concerning the same
property, the Option and the same parties.

Inasmuch as Archer and

Wolfe had rejected Miller's prior offer, and had expressly
repudiated the Option in their Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint,
all parties and their attorneys understood that Miller's tender of
a cashier's check would not be accepted by the Defendants.
Moreover, neither Archer nor Wolfe were in the State at the time.
Archer admitted on the stand that he would not have accepted
Plaintiff's tender of $650,000.00 on July 1, 1983 in any event.
Fillmore and Smay determined that the best way to handle the
matter would be to tender the $650,000.00 to the Defendants via
the Court and then deposit the same upon endorsement in a
Court-supervised, interest-bearing account.
55.

On July 1, 1983, Fillmore met with Smay at the latter's

office in Salt Lake City and tendered to Smay, as Defendants'
attorney, Plaintiff's cashier's check to the Defendants for
$650,000.00 (Exhibit 13), which money had been borrowed by
Plaintiff, subject to interest charges.

At said meeting the
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the check would be deposited in a Court-supervised, interest-

|

bearing account and that "entitlement to accrued interest shall be i
determined by the Court".

Pursuant thereto, lillmore later

QflfZ

-21that same day filed said Delivery of Check and Motion and the
Order with this Court and deposited the check with the Clerk of
the Court.
56.

The language contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, and in

the Delivery of Check and Motion and the stipulated Order, and the
verbal expressions of Fillmore to Smay on July 1, 1983, substantially conformed with the tender language requirements of
paragraph 3 of the Option.
57.

The Option was exercised on July 1, 1983 by Plaintiff,

without any objection or protest being made by Colman to Plaintiff
either before or since.
58.

The Option was exercised by Plaintiff according to its

terms - i.e., the Option called for a tender of $650,000.00 on or
before July 2, 1983, which requirements Plaintiff met precisely.
The Defendants were in no way prejudiced by the date of
Plaintiff's execise of the Option, inasmuch as they had already
granted that much time to the original optionee.

Moreover, the

Defendants had already made it abundantly clear to Plaintiff, by
virtue of their prior rejections, that they did not intend to
accept any tender by Plaintiff regardless of when it might be
made.
59.

Shortly thereafter, at Smay's suggestion, the parties

through their attorneys entered into a Stipulation to replace the
original check (Exhibit 13) with a new check (Exhibit 16), so as
to permit the deposit of the tendered funds, in the absence of the
Defendants from the State, into an interest-bearing account.
Pursuant to that Stipulation, $650,000.00 was subsequently
deposited at First Interstate Bank, Logan Branch.

In the Fall of

1983, the deposited funds were invested in revolving monthly
Certificates of Deposit at said bank, which arrangement continued
until the time of trial.
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60.

On July 2, 1984 Colman, Archer and Wolfe entered into a

:ST CENTER
BOX 525

jcertain Agreement (Exhibit 33), whereby Colman, for $5,000.00, "as

UTAH 84321
1752-1551

further consideration for this agreement," agreed to convey to
jArcher and WoLfe a fifty percent (50%) interest in the Anderson

-22Ranch which he hoped to procure through an attempted exercise
of his paragraph 4.b. option under the Real Estate Contract; and
whereby Archer and Wolfe agreed to permit Plaintiff to withdraw
$364,000.00 from the Court-supervised savings account, as and for
Colman1s tender of that sum, to make possible Colman's exercise of
the 4.b. option, with the express understanding that Colman would
deed said interest over to Archer and Wolfe upon his receipt of a
deed from Miller.

The Defendants and their attorney had

previously received copies of the Real Estate Contract by way of
Plaintiff's prior pleadings and the discovery herein.
61.

On July 2, 1984, a Notice from Colman (Exhibit 31) and a

Stipulation from the Defendants (Exhibit 32) was serv ed on John
Clay, an officer of E. A. Miller & Sons Packing Co., e company^ 5L
effectively controlled by Plaintiff, advising Plaintiff that

#A

Defendants were willing to allow him to withdraw $364,000.00 from
the Court-supervised account for purposes of Colman1s exercise of
the 4.b. option, which attempted exercise of the 4.b. option by
Colman (and Archer and Wolfe) was never accepted by Miller.
62.

Nonetheless, the funds in the Court-supervised account

were not Colman1s funds, nor were they the Defendants' funds absent their delivery of a deed to Plaintiff (See the terms of Exhibit 14, paragraph 4 ) , which they had not done.

Moreover, if Mil-

ler had accepted such a tender on July 2, and withdrawn the funds,
the withdrawal would have been subject to an early withdrawal
penalty under the certificate of deposit (See Exhibit 60).
63.

Prior to Colman1s (and the Defendants') attempted exer-

cise of the 4.b. option, neither Colman nor Defendants had secured
Plaintiff's prior written approval of any assignment of Colman1s
rights, as required by paragraph 4.f. of the Real Estate Contract,
nor was there any prior verbal notice to or approval by Plaintiff.
In fact, it appears that Defendants structured their deal in a
deliberate manner to avoid the non-assignability clause.
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64.

In connection with Colman's (and the Defendants')

attempted exercise of the 4.b. option, no recognition was ever
i
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given to Miller's first right of refusal.

The Plaintiff was never1

-23given written (or verbal) notice of the Agreement between
Defendants and Colman, nor the sale terms thereof which he would
have to meet, nor was he ever allowed to exercise his first right
of refusal within thirty (30) days after receiving a copy of what
should have been a conditional agreement between Colman and the
Defendants, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract.
Plaintiff did not learn of, or receive a copy of, the Agreement
between the Defendants and Colman until the discovery of the same
was compelled at Defendants1 second depositions on September 27,
1984.

The Agreement between Colman and the Defendants

unconditionally required Colman to convey to Defendants all his
rights in the Anderson Ranch which he was to acquire pursuant to
paragraph 4.b.
65.

of the Real Estate Contract.

The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any kind

suggesting collusion or conspiracy between Colman and Plaintiff to
defraud Defendants of their interests in the Anderson Ranch or
regarding any damages suffered by Defendants related thereto, as
alleged in their Amended Answer and Counterclaim.

Indeed,

Defendants introduced little, if any, evidence concerning these
allegations.
&
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66. The legal description of the Anderson Ranch contained inj
the Contract, the Option, the Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and
Release and Plaintiff's Complaint all contain an obvious
scrivenor's error, referencing

Township 10 South", instead of the

correct description, "Township 10 North", under Parcel 3.
»N & HOGGAN
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None o

the parties herein are under any misconception as to which
property was intended to be sold, assigned or otherwise referred
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to in these documents and pleadings, nor have Defendants seriously
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claimed any prejudice if the Court reforms the same.
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67. The Defendants have enjoyed possession and all rights of
ownership of the Anderson Ranch since Plaintiff's July 1, 1983
tender of the $650,000.00. The Defendants have executed leases
with third parties for the use of the Anderson Ranch, most recently with Boyd Munns, to run cattle on the ranch property. All
rents paid under such leases have been received by the Defendants.
68. In contrast to the Defendants, the Plaintiff has
received no rents or income, nor has he had any other commercial
benefit, from the Anderson Ranch since his tender of $650,000.00
on July 1, 1983; nor has he had the use of his money since then.
What limited and sporadic recreational use Plaintiff has had of
the ranch has been without objection by the owners and similar to
that enjoyed historically by many others in the area.
69. The Defendants could have received the $650,000.00
lodged in the Court-supervised savings account at any time after
July 1, 1983 if they would have provided Plaintiff with a proper
deed, but they have never delivered a deed to Plaintiff entitling
them to said tender money.
70. The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any collusion
or conspiracy between Colman and Miller to defraud the Defendants
out of their interests in the Anderson Ranch, as alleged by
Defendants1 in their Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.
71. Exhibits 54,55 and 56 are notes made by Colman at or
about the time of various conversations between Colman, Archer and
!
Wolfe and should be admitted as evidence. Exhibit 28 is Colman1s
| Affidavit made prior to this litigation and is corroborative of
the Court1s findings on various issues and should be admitted in
evidence for all purposes.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON & HOGGAN
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1. This Court has in rem jurisdiction over the Anderson
Ranch; personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiff, all the
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Defendants and the Third-Party Defendant; and subject matter
jurisdiction over those matters which have been brought before the
Court by way of the parties1 pleadings, including without
limitation all matters affecting title to the Anderson Ranch as
between the parties named herein.
2. That the Real Estate Contract is valid and enforceable in
all respects and that the Option granted by Archer and Wolfe to
Colman is irrevocable, valid in all respects and is supported by a
sufficient consideration.
3. That the Option was fully assignable by Colman, was
assigned to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is the owner and holder of
the Option. The Waiver and Release is a valid and enforceable
agreement in all respects and extended to July 2, 1983 the time
within which Miller should exercise the Option.
4. That Plaintiff made a valid exercise of the Option under
the circumstances and is entitled to a decree specifically
enforcing the Option.
5. Given the uniqueness of the Anderson Ranch property,
money damages would be inadequate compensation to the Plaintiff
for Defendants1 repudiation of the Option.
6. That Plaintiff has paid the purchase price provided in
the Option by depositing the same with the Clerk of the Court and
a decree should enter awarding the $650,000.00 so paid by
Plaintiff to Defendants.
7. That interest accrued on the $650,000.00 purchase price
deposited with the Court is the property of Plaintiff and a decree
should enter awarding Plaintiff all interest accrued on said
$650,000.00 while in the custody of the Clerk of the Court.
8. That a decree should enter correcting the scrivenors
error describing Parcel 3 of the legal description in the Option,
Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and Release, and Plaintiff's

RNEYS AT LAW
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-26Verified Complaint, to Township 10 North rather than Township
10 South.
9.

Neither the Real Estate Contract or the rights and

entitlements of Colman thereunder were assignable by Colman to any
third party without Plaintiff's prior written consent, which
consent was never sought nor given by Plaintiff.
10.

The first right of refusal granted to Miller by Colman

under paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract was a valid, legal
right vested in Miller and enforceable by him against Colman and
any third party.
11.

The Waiver and Release was a valid and enforceable

agreement between Colman and Plaintiff, was supported by adequate
consideration and was intended to and did enable Plaintiff to
lawfully exercise the Option to purchase the Anderson Ranch on or
before July 2, 1983.
12.

The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option

under the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Defendants) on July
2, 1984 was an invalid exercise of that option right and is,
therefore, void and of no effect.
13.

The said Warranty Deeds from Royalty Investment

Corporation to Defendants on the Anderson Ranch effected a valid
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Royalty Investment Corporation)
to Defendants.
14.

i

An order should enter admitting Exhibits- 28, 54, 55 and j

56 in evidence, 7 ^ ^ - t f c
15.

Possession of trie Anderson Ranch should b£^delivered to^>Vf

Plaintiff.
16.

Though the Court finds that the applicable burden of

]

proof upon Plaintiff is a preponderance of the evidence, the Courtj
concludes that Plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving his
N & HOGGAN
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claims against Defendants and Third-Party Defendants in this case J
by clear and convincing evidence.

I
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-2717. Plaintiff's pleadings should be amended to conform in
all respects to Plaintiff's theories, arguments and evidence
presented at trial.
LET JUDGMENT ENTER ACCp^DINGLY^
'L 1986.
DATED t h i s ^7 -^ day o]

L Oiner J . Ca
D i s t r i c t Jiidjg'e
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Defendants1 Attorney,
E. Craig Smay, at 208 Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101; and to Third-Party Defendant, William J. Colman,
at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage
prepaid in Logan, Utah, this
day of July, 1986.

X^/jLtcfZ

L. Brent Hoggan
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qi3

L. Brent Hoggan
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
ERNEST J. MILLER,
Plaintiff,
vs,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH
B. ARCHER, both individually and
as Trustees for the Elizabeth
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott
Wolfe Trust No. 701,
Defendants.

JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH
B. ARCHER, both individually and
as Trustees for the Elizabeth
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott
Wolfe Trust No. 701,

Civil No. 21692

Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
&HOGGAN
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WILLIAM J. COLMAN,
Third-Party Defendant.
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-2THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call, District Judge,
presiding and sitting without a jury, on September 18, 19, 20, 27,
October 3, November 14, and December 17, 1985; and Plaintiff
having been represented by its counsel of record, L. Brent Hoggan,
of Olson & Hoggan, the Defendants having been represented by their
counsel of record, E. Craig Smay, and the Third-Party Defendant
having been represented by himself; and the Court having heard
testimony from witnesses for all the parties hereto during the
trial hereof and having received certain exhibits offered by the
parties as evidence in the matter; and the Court having received
trial briefs from counsel for both Plaintiff and the Defendants on
the primary issues before the Court, and having reviewed the
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment prepared by Plaintiff and the
Defendants1 Objections thereto, and the Court having heretofore
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
!•

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure No, 15, and on

Plaintiff's motion at trial, the Plaintiff's Complaint is deemed
amended to conform to the evidence and Plaintiff's arguments at
trial, specifically including but not limited to quieting title to
the Anderson Ranch with regard to Colman's (and Archer and
Wolfe1s) attempted exercise of the 4.b. option one (1)-year after
this litigation commenced, Plaintiff's claim to the accruing
interest on the tender money, and Plaintiff's request that the
Option, Real Estate Contract, Waiver and Release and the Complaint
herein be reformed to reflect the correct legal description of the
Anderson Ranch.
2.

The Court declares that the recorded Option, Real Estate

Contract and Waiver and Release are valid agreements, binding on
6c HOGGAN
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UTAH 84321
1752-1551

all parties thereto, and fully enforceable by Plaintiff as the

-3proper assignee of Colmanfs Option on the Anderson Ranch and
all appurtenant water rights.
3. Plaintiff is the owner and holder of the Option, the
Option is declared irrevocable, and by virtue of Plaintiff's
proper exercise of the Option and Plaintiff's tender on July 1,
1983 of the purchase price provided in the Option, the Option is
specifically enforced and title to the Anderson Ranch situated in
Cache County, Utah and described as follows:
Parcel 1: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter;
the South half of the Northeast quarter; the Southeast
quarter of the Northwest quarter; the East half of the
Southeast quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southwest
quarter of Section 26; the North half of the Northwest
quarter; the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Section 25; the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter;
the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter; the Southwest
quarter of the Southeast quarter; the South half of the
Southwest quarter of Section 24; the Southeast quarter of the
Southeast quarter of Section 23; in Township 10 North, Range
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; Lots 2, 3 and 4; the
Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter; the Southwest
quarter of the Southeast quarter; and the Northeast quarter
of the Southeast quarter of Section 19, Township 10 North,
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
Parcel 2: The West half of the Southeast quarter and the
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26, Township 10
North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 3: The Northeast quarter; the Southeast quarter of
the Northwest quarter; the Northeast quarter of the Southwest
quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Section 19, the East half of the Northeast quarter; and the
North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 30, in
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Also the Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 26,
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
& HOGGAN
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Parcel 4: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter; and the Southeast

-4quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 10
North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Containing 1840.14 acres, more or less, subject to existing
rights of way.
Together with -all water rights appurtenant to the abovedescribed property.
is hereby vested and quieted in Plaintiff free and clear of
all right and claim by Defendants, Royalty Investment Corporation
or Colman and any claiming by, under or through Defendants,
Royalty Investment Corporation or Colman.
4.

The $650,000.00 deposited by Plaintiff with the Clerk of

the Court is declared to be payment in full by Plaintiff to
Defendants for the Anderson Ranch.

The Clerk of the Court is

authorized and directed to deliver to Defendants on their request
the $650,000.00 principal.
5.

All interest accrued on the $650,000.00 deposited by

Plaintiff with the Clerk of the Court is declared to be the
property of Plaintiff and the Clerk of the Court is authorized and
!

i, directed to deliver all such accrued interest to Plaintiff on his |
ll request.
I|

6.

The legal description in the Option (recorded in Book 310

li at Page 144 of the records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) in ,
the Real Estate Contract (recorded in Book 310 at Page 147 of the
records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) in the Waiver and

i

Release (recorded in Book 315 and Page 658 of the records of the
I Cache County, Utah Recorder), as well as in the Verified Complaint
filed by the Plaintiff herein, are each and all reformed to show
1

Parcel 3 situated in Township 10 North, rather than Township 10
!

jj South.
''

7.

That possession of the Anderson Ranch, described above,

is hereby delivered to Plaintiff free and clear of any claim,
N&HOGGAN
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-5possessory or otherwise, of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants
and Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty
Investment Corporation,
8.

The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option under

the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Archer and Wolfe) on July
2, 1984 is declared by the Court to be an invalid exercise of that
option right.

The agreement and any assignments or conveyances of

whatsoever nature between Colman and the Defendants related
thereto are hereby declared void and of no effect as to the
parties herein; and full, undivided title in fee simple to the
Anderson Ranch is hereby quieted in Plaintiff as against any and
all claims or rights of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants and
Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty
Investment Corporation.
9.

j

The Plaintiff1s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and

Motion To Strike are rendered moot by this Judgment and Decree,
which effectively grants the partial relief sought by those
motions but which is based on the entire trial record.
10.

The Defendants1 Cross-Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment is denied.

Defendants1 Counterclaim against the

Plaintiff and Defendants' Third-Party Complaint against Colman are
dismissed with preiudice.
11. That Exhibits 28, 54, 55 and 56 are admitted in /

evidenced
12.
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The parties shall bear their own respective attorney s

fees, but Plaintiff jLs awarded his court costs incurred herein.
DATED this

/»

day of -*&3/, 1986. -
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Omer J. Call
"
District Judges
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-6MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing
Judgment and Decree to Defendants1 Attorney, E. Craig Smay, at 208
Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and
to Third-Party Defendant, William J, Colman, at 1935 South Main,
Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage prepaid in Logan,
Utah, this %*~ day of July, 1986.

/^/^U^f
L. Brent Hoggan
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-7MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a certified copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Judgment and Decree to
L. Brent Hoggan, Olson & Hoggan, Attorneys for Plaintiff, 56 West Center,
P. 0. Box 525, Logan, Utah 84321; E. Craig Smay at 208 Kearns Building,
136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and to Third-Party Defendant,
William J. Colman, at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah
84105, postage prepaid in Brigham City, Utah, this 7th day of August,
1986.

Mary C. Holmgren-Deputy

EXHIBIT

V

AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

) SS.

WILLIAM J* COLMAN, being first duly swornr on oath
deposes and says:
1.

I am the President of Owanah Oil Company and I am

also President of Royalty Investment Company.

I maintain

offices at 1935 South Mainf Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah
84115. The companies with which I am affiliated are among the
developers of a salt project at the Carson Sink in Churchill
County, Nevada.
2.

In the fall of 1981, I had occasion to discuss

with John D. Archer the urgency of my obtaining money to
carry on the Carson Sink project.

Mr. Archer told me that he

and a friend of his, Elliott Wolfe, might be willing to make
$500,000 available to the project if the deal could be
structured so that they would be certain to get a 20% return
on their money over a one year period.

I told Mr. Archer

that I could secure any deal we made with the Anderson Ranch
in Cache County, Utah.
3. Shortly after our first conversation, Mr. Archer
came back to me and told me he was satisfied with the
Anderson Ranch as security, but that he wanted to structure
the arrangement so that he and Wolfe could get the greatest
possible tax advantage from letting my companies use their

-2money.

He proposed that we set up a limited partnership,

that he and Wolfe contribute $250,000 to the limited
partnership which would be used for intangibles at the Carson
Sink so that he and Wolfe could take the intangibles as an
expense, and that he and Wolfe buy the Anderson Ranch for
$250,000 and give me an option to repurchase it for $600,000
within one year.

Archer told me that the best way to avoid

IRS investigation of the deal would be to space the
individual transactions over some significant time. I told
him I had no quarrel with our handling the deal the way he
wanted to, and I would have my attorney draft the necessary
papers.
4. In September or early October, 1981,

I asked

my lawyer, Frank J. Allen, to prepare the necessary documents
for the limited partnership, the ranch purchase, and the
option back, and he prepared those documents.
5. Archer, Wolfe and I met with Mr. Allen at his.
office sometime in October, 1981.

Mr. Allen told Mr. Archer

and Mr. Wolfe that he could not advise them with respect to
the tax implications of the deal we were making, but he
reviewed with us the limited partnership certificate and
agreement, the Anderson Ranch purchase documents, and the
option for my repurchase of the Anderson Ranch.

We decided

to give me an extra 6 months to repurchase the ranch so we
increased the option price from $600,000 to $650,000

-3so that Archer and Wolfe would realize a 20% return on their
money over 18 months instead of just one year.
6.

All of the papers for the three transactions which

made up our total deal were completed before we ever signed
the limited partnership agreement and it was agreed that

the

ranch purchase instruments would be dated about 3 months
after the limited partnership certificatef and the option
about three months after the purchase. Archer and Wolfe
acknowledged that they had received the consideration for the
option because that was a part of the total deal we had made.
The whole concept of our agreement was that Archer and Wolfe
would realize a 20% return on a $500f000 investment and would
be able to show that return as capital gain as well as show
$250,000 as expenses in 1981 and 1982.
7. Neither Archer nor Wolfe ever asked for the
$5f000.00 which is the recited consideration for the option
until several months after the date which appears on the
option instrument.

Mr, Archer then said he and Wolfe had

never received the $5,000.00 and I told them they had
acknowledged receiving it because that was part of the
consideration for my entering into the deal with them.

I

never received any written demand or notice that they
considered the option void.
8.

The reason certain signature lines on the Option

are left blank is that Wolfe and Archer represented to me and

-4Frank Allen that they had full authority to execute any and
all documents for their respective family trusts and that the
additional signatures of co-trustees were not required.
relied on those representations in making the deal.
Dated this

>~ day of Mayf 1983.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

May, 1983.
My commission expires: Notary Puolic
Nov. 14, 1984
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
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